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POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME. By Setsuo Miyazawa,
translated by Frank G. Bennett, Jr. [with] John 0. Haley. State
University of New York Press 1992. Pp. 267.
Professor Setsuo Miyazawa's Policing in Japan: A Study on Making
Crime I represents a very valuable addition to the growing body of
English-language works on the Japanese police. This is the first
such observational study of the police by a Japanese scholar and the
only study to examine the behavior of Japanese detectives.
2
Miyazawa, a professor at Kobe University and one of the leading
legal sociologists in Japan, has buttressed his own observations with
an extensive, and revealing, questionnaire survey of police attitudes.
Miyazawa conducted the study underlying this book in 1974,
when he was a doctoral candidate at Hokkaido University. After
completing his dissertation, he published it first in a series of law
review articles and then as a book in Japanese in 1985. 3 Policing in
Japan is the English-language version of that work (ably translated
by Frank G. Bennett, Jr.). Despite the passage of nearly twenty
years since Miyazawa's initial study, the fundamental features ofJap-
anese criminal procedure law remain essentially unchanged, and
there is little reason to think that police attitudes have shifted in any
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. Professor Foote has
spent over seven years in Japan, including nearly two and one half years as research
scholar (1983-85) and visiting professor (1991) at the University of Tokyo Faculty of
Law. He teaches comparative criminal justice and has written widely on Japanese crimi-
nal justice.
1 SETSUO MIYAZAWA, POLICING IN JAPAN: A STUDY ON MAKING CRIME (Frank G. Ben-
nett, Jr. with John 0. Haley trans., State University of New York Press 1992) (1985).
2 AnotherJapanese scholar, Masayuki Murayama, conducted an observational study
of patrol police in the Tokyo area in 1977 and 1978, and published his findings in Japa-
nese in 1990, under the title KEIRA KEIsATsu No KENKYU [A STUDY OF PATROL POLICE].
3 See MIYAZAWA, supra note 1, at xv.
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major way. Thus, Miyazawa's observations continue to ring true to-
day. Moreover, in preparing the English-language version,
Miyazawa has substantially revised the earlier work and has supple-
mented it both with background information essential to a foreign
readership unfamiliar with Japanese law and with information on
more recent developments.
Miyazawa speculates that one of the reasons he was the first Jap-
anese scholar given permission to conduct a study of this nature
may have been the fact that he was still young (and presumably un-
published), and that the police therefore may have thought he
"might become a police sympathizer." 4 If so, the police were sorely
mistaken. Miyazawa reports that "it became the focus of my re-
search to find situations where the procedure-minded supervisors
would deviate from their own principles under [the] pressure [to
improve their statistics], where the precarious balance of due pro-
cess and crime control would be broken in favor of the latter."5 In
deciding whether to treat a particular police action as "questiona-
ble" or not, Miyazawa chose "to make the standard of questionabil-
ity quite low and concentrate on whether an action arouses even
slight debate or doubt."
'6
Miyazawa succeeded in his aim of showing that the Japanese po-
lice engage in aggressive investigations. In one case he observed,
detectives held a bar hostess-whose complaints of illness, it turned
out, were true-in a police holding cell for sixteen days. They re-
peatedly questioned her for hours at a time throughout that period
as they sought to get her to confess to numerous thefts. 7 In another
case, police subjected an arson suspect to intense interrogation
throughout an entire month during which he was held at the police
station.8 Miyazawa thus provides detailed real-life examples of the
careful interrogation of suspects which, despite the stated existence
of a right to silence in Japan's Criminal Procedure Code,9 is a stan-
4 Id. at 31.
5 Id. at 34.
6 Id. at 101.
7 Id. at 57-67.
8 Id. at 67-89.
9 KEOI SosH6H6 (Code of Criminal Procedure), Law No. 131 of 1948 [hereinafter
CODE CRIM. P.]. Following World War II, Japan's existing Code of Criminal Procedure,
which was based heavily on a German model, was thoroughly revised under Occupation
influence. In addition, the Occupation insisted that the new postwar Constitution,
KENP6 [hereinafter CONST.], contain a series of basic rights for criminal suspects and
defendants. Largely based upon American principles, the postwar reforms included
strengthening warrant requirements for both arrests and searches, establishing broad
limits on searches and seizures, instituting a privilege against self-incrimination, prohib-
iting the use of coerced confessions at trial, and strengthening the adversary system. See
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dard feature of actual Japanese criminal investigations. Moreover,
Miyazawa supplemented his own observations with descriptions of
numerous recent scandals involving the police, including the illegal
wiretapping of the phone of a Japan Communist Party official and
cases involving the bribing of police officers. 10
By examining these darker aspects of the Japanese police sys-
tem, this book serves as an important and sobering counterweight
to the positive assessments of the Japanese police contained in most
other English-language materials on the subject." Yet, given
Miyazawa's stated aim of uncovering questionable practices by po-
lice, coupled with his decision to treat as "questionable" any action
that "arouses even slight debate or doubt," to American readers the
key question may not be why there are so many questionable prac-
tices by Japanese police, but why there are not far more. This is
particularly true when one takes into account the social setting
Miyazawa describes.
According to Miyazawa, the Japanese police system internally
places primary emphasis upon achieving high clearance rates.12 Po-
lice officers are commended and rewarded for solving large num-
bers of crimes efficiently. Success in clearing crimes might lead to
the coveted goals of promotion (including promotions from patrol
to detective status) and transfer to a desirable location (such as the
Eastern District of Sapporo, where Miyazawa conducted his study).
In contrast, says Miyazawa, "procedural compliance was not re-
warded."' 13 Nor, presumably, as he makes no mention of any such
instance in the cases he observed, were detectives punished for vio-
lating procedural rules. Moreover, detectives apparently do not
even view the possibility of such penalties as a danger. According to
Miyazawa, "observational data clearly indicates that the detectives
generally Richard B. Appleton, Reforms in Japanese Criminal Procedure under Allied Occupation,
24 WASH. L. REV. 401 (1949). For a discussion of how the impact of certain of these
reforms has been limited in practice, infra notes 38-47 and accompanying text.
10 MIYAZAWA, supra note 1, at 5.
11 The growing body of literature on crime prevention and policing in Japan in-
cludes: WILLIAM CLIFFORD, CRIME CONTROL IN JAPAN (1976); WALTER L. AMES, POLICE
AND COMMUNITY IN JAPAN (1981); L. CRAIG PARKER, JR., THE JAPANESE POLICE SYSTEM
TODAY: AN AMERICAN PERSPECTIVE (1984); DAVID BAYLEY, FORCES OF ORDER: POLICING
MODERN JAPAN (1991); TED D. WESTERMANN &JAMES W. BURFEIND, CRIME ANDJUSTICE
IN Two SOCIETIES: JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES (1991); and ROBERT Y. THORNTON &
KATSUYA ENDO, PREVENTING CRIME IN AMERICA AND JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE STUDY
(1992). Ames, Parker, Bayley, and Thornton and Endo base their work in substantial
part on observations of the police.
12 Miyazawa cites statistics from 1985, showing a clearance rate for major crimes of
64.2% inJapan, as compared with 20.9% in the United States and 47.2% in then-West
Germany. MIYAZAWA, supra note I, at 13.
13 Id. at 216.
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believe that they are evaluated solely in terms of investigative effi-
ciency, and that procedural compliance does not count at all."' 14
What then of external constraints on police behavior?
Miyazawa considers four possible sources of external oversight: de-
fense counsel; prosecutors; judges; and the public, as represented
by the mass media. For varying reasons, he concludes as to all four
that "expectations and controls from these sources work mainly to
demand, excuse, or ignore aggressive investigative action."' 15
As Miyazawa observes, indigents in Japan are not entitled to de-
fense counsel until indictment, after the investigation has been com-
pleted. Even where suspects with sufficient means have retained
attorneys at the investigation stage, he reports, the attorneys typi-
cally do not aggressively challenge police investigative activities.
For these reasons, he concludes, "attorneys are not taken very seri-
ously by supervisors and detectives . . . in ordinary cases [and] do
not have a great impact upon the operation of criminal
investigation."1
6
Regarding prosecutors, Miyazawa describes an ambiguous
oversight role. Although prosecutors frequently caution police to
exercise restraint in their investigations (and on occasion reinforce
the message by refusing to file warrant requests or to indict suspects
in cases where they believe the police have overstepped appropriate
bounds), they often send precisely the opposite message by request-
ing the police to obtain more thorough confessions and other evi-
dence. "To the detectives," Miyazawa observes, "[these requests
for more evidence mean] longer detention of the suspect [, tougher
interrogation . . . [and] . . . longer and more aggressive
investigations. . . .. ,17
As described by Miyazawa, the views of the public and the mass
media, while also somewhat ambiguous, on the whole operate to
condone and even encourage aggressive investigations. Occasional
incidents, such as the wiretapping and bribery cases mentioned ear-
lier, have provoked widespread condemnation in the Japanese
press.' 8 Yet, as Miyazawa reports, the much more dominant tone in
14 Id. at 213.
15 Id. at 217.
16 Id. at 219. Of course, even if defense counsel do not file immediate challenges at
the investigation stage, they might still play a valuable oversight role by challenging use
of the results of the investigation at trial or filing other claims against questionable po-
lice conduct. Miyazawa only touches on this possibility, but he implies that defense
counsel typically do not aggressively pursue these avenues either. This in turn may re-
late to the low likelihood of success even if they were to do so.
17 Id. at 222.
18 Id. at 5.
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media coverage favors aggressive investigative activities, including
tough interrogation of suspects. As an instructor at the police acad-
emy observed, "[the police in a popular television show] engage in
illegal investigations as a matter of course. Nonetheless they are ac-
cepted by the public."1 9 Moreover, the media seldom question the
police about procedural improprieties and routinely press the police
to exert greater efforts to solve major crimes-frequently criticizing
suspects for "hiding behind" the right to silence and exhorting the
police to "get the suspect to confess."
20
This leaves judges as the remaining possible outside guardians
of procedural standards. Miyazawa writes that "Japanese detectives
are strongly concerned with .. .judicial behavior, especially in a
case on which they are personally working."' 21 He describes in-
stances in which detectives voiced concern over possible judicial re-
jection of applications for warrants and detention because the
detectives felt that their activities had come close to the legal lim-
its. 2 2 Yet the courts never denied the applications in those cases.
This suggests, Miyazawa says, that either the courts did not know
the actual circumstances of the cases or chose to overlook the
"problematic elements." 23 Given these circumstances, he con-
cludes, "detectives see no significant threat injudicial control." 24 In
fact, he reports, concern over judicial scrutiny operated in a quite
different manner: Detectives believe that the courts place primary
emphasis on substantive aspects of the case, such as the contents of
confessions and their consistency with other evidence, rather than
procedural matters. This belief "serves to promote longer, more
aggressive investigations and interrogations."
25
In sum, according to Miyazawa, the internal incentive structure
for the Japanese police favors aggressive investigations and con-
19 Id. at 227.
20 As examples, Miyazawa cites several headlines, including: "Man runs and hides;
Cafeteria operator arrested; Pretends ignorance at interrogation." Id. at 228.
Another headline in the same vein involved the case of Kazuyoshi Miura, who was
suspected of having had his wife killed for insurance money. He was arrested (initially
on a charge of conspiracy in an earlier attack on his wife by his girlfriend) but refused to
talk. Even though the right to silence is recognized by Japanese law, media coverage
centered on how Miura could be forced to confess. A typical headline that appeared in a
popular news magazine read: "This Is the Way I'd Bring Down the 'Pro of Evil' Who
Won't Confess." Daniel H. Foote, Confessions and the Right to Silence in Japan, 21 GA. J.
INT'L & CoMP. L. 415, 467 n.245 (1991).
21 MIYAZAWA, supra note 1, at 223.
22 Id. at 53, 55-57, 65, 69, 192-93.





dones procedural improprieties. Defense counsel are lax and inef-
fective. Police supervisors, prosecutors, and judges all give lip
service to procedural niceties but then demand thorough and inten-
sive investigations. Finally, the public and mass media clamor for
the police to solve crimes and obtain confessions, and rarely criticize
police for overstepping their bounds (and then typically only if it
turns out that an innocent person was wrongly accused or con-
victed). Given this setting, one might expect Japan to be both rife
with procedural violations by police and largely bereft of any con-
cern for the formal procedural standards contained in the Constitu-
tion and the Code of Criminal Procedure-which, in keeping with
an American model under the influence of the Occupation, include
strict warrant requirements, protections against unreasonable
searches and seizures, an express right to silence and prohibition
against use of non-voluntary confessions, and a strong adversary
system. 2
6
Despite Miyazawa's emphasis on uncovering "questionable" ac-
tivities by police detectives, his factual observations for the most
part belie the image of a police force out of control. It comes as
little surprise that Miyazawa saw no evidence of physical abuse. It
seems highly unlikely that police would engage in physical abuse in
the presence of an academic observer; and, given the code of silence
that would undoubtedly apply, 27 it would be very difficult to learn of
such abuse otherwise, even if it were widespread (and most other
observers agree with Miyazawa's findings that it is not 28). Still,
Miyazawa's account reveals that attention to procedural niceties
runs far beyond simply eschewing the rubber hose.
Training in applicable procedural standards begins at the police
academy. There, Miyazawa notes, "heavy stress is laid upon respect
26 See, e.g., Appleton, supra note 9; Atsushi Nagashima, The Accused and Society: The
Administration of CriminalJustice in Japan, in LAw INJAPAN: THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANG-
ING SoCIETY 297 (Arthur T. von Mehren ed., 1963). For a comprehensive treatise on
Japanese criminal procedure, see SHIGEMITSU DANDO, JAPANESE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
(1965). Although each of the above materials is over a quarter-century old, the funda-
mental concepts and interpretations have remained remarkably stable.
27 Miyazawa recounts a conversation with a police supervisor who proudly described
how strict obedience is in the Japanese police force: "If I gave just one word, it would
be a piece of cake to cover up the truth from you." Of course, the supervisor went on to
assure Miyazawa that he would never give such an order. MIYAZAWA, supra note 1, at
183.
28 See, e.g., AMES, supra note 11, at 134-37; BAYLEY, supra note 11, at 1-4, 52-53;
Ryilichi Hirano, Diagnosis of the Current Code of Criminal Procedure, 22 LAw IN JAPAN 129,
137 (1989). But see Igarashi Futaba, Forced to Confess, in DEMOCRACY IN CONTEMPORARY
JAPAN 195, 196-205 (Gavan McCormack & Yoshio Sugimoto eds., 1986) (alleging wide-
spread physical abuse and harsh treatment).
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for procedure." 29 He even describes one instance in which an in-
structor went well beyond what Japanese Supreme Court precedent
requires. The precedent in question was a 1961 decision involving a
search incident to arrest. In that case, police went to a house, osten-
sibly to arrest a suspect for selling drugs. The suspect was not
home, but the police went ahead and searched the entire house
while waiting for him to return, and then arrested him. The
Supreme Court upheld the search, holding that a search incident to
arrest may take place even before the arrest, and even if the suspect
is not yet present. Although that decision presumably remains good
law today, the instructor, after explaining the case, flatly stated,
"this holding is unreasonable." 30 While the instructor may have
drawn the proper conclusion, his teaching scarcely suggests an ag-
gressive desire to take advantage of every investigative tool the
courts are willing to recognize.
As Miyazawa points out, the most important question is not
what is taught at the academy, but what happens in actual practice.
But on the streets as well as in the classroom, the police Miyazawa
observed showed considerable restraint. Although Miyazawa ob-
serves that supervisors on occasion encourage detectives to under-
take aggressive investigations, he repeatedly notes that, in the
district he observed, supervisors were on the whole very concerned
with observing applicable procedural standards. "An ideal detective
not only must master regulations, one supervisor says, but he also
must be conservative and precise with respect to procedures."
3'
Similarly, Miyazawa quotes the following admonition from a super-
visor to his subordinates: "Even things which are not illegal may
cause trouble if they are inappropriate. You must act rationally, le-
gally, appropriately. I want you to pay constant attention to these
points."3
2
As these quotations reflect, supervisors normally take a rela-
tively conservative approach to procedural standards, rather than
pressing prior precedent to the limit. This bears particular note,
given the rather common pattern of so-called kyz-sai hanketsu (liter-
ally, "relief judgments") by Japanese courts dealing with criminal
procedure issues. The reliefjudgments are in essence a form ofju-
dicial jawboning. In a typical formulation, a court will state that a
certain investigative practice-for example, asking a suspect to
come to the police station "voluntarily" late one evening and pro-
29 MIYAZAWA, supra note 1, at 128.
30 Id. at 119.
31 Id. at 196.
32 Id. at 200.
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ceeding to question him all night and half the next day, or arresting
a suspect on a minor crime such as assault and then questioning
about an unrelated major crime such as murder-is not illegal, but
comes close to the limits of acceptability and is "inappropriate" or
"undesirable." No evidence is excluded, and the conviction remains
intact, but the court sends a message to police and prosecutors that
such activity should be avoided in the future. One could easily im-
agine that police might either ignore such a decision, treating it as
mere dictum at best, or even regard it as a license to engage in such
activity freely in the future, since the court concluded that the activ-
ity was not illegal. Miyazawa's account suggests, however, that po-
lice supervisors take these decisions seriously in determining the
limits of appropriate police behavior.
Miyazawa makes clear, moreover, that the supervisors' state-
ments went beyond mere lip service. After noting reports of lax su-
pervisor oversight of police detectives in the United States and
Canada, Miyazawa states that the situation in Japan is quite differ-
ent. The supervisors he observed routinely reviewed detectives' re-
quests for warrants and criticized (and on occasion rejected) them if
they failed to meet procedural requirements, kept close watch over
the investigative techniques used by detectives, and oversaw interro-
gations based on detailed progress reports. Miyazawa concludes
that "even if complete control is impossible, supervisors strive
mightily to maintain correct procedures," and adds: "Most supervi-
sors I observed were very conscientious in maintaining close
supervision." 33
The detectives Miyazawa observed were not as concerned with
procedural niceties as their supervisors, and he reports rather wide-
spread frustration among detectives over procedure-minded super-
visors who failed to appreciate the practical needs of investigators.
Nonetheless, the cases he describes and his survey results disclose
that, while not always exercising procedural restraint, detectives
paid close attention to a wide range of procedural matters.3 4 Given
33 Id. at 202.
34 For example, detectives typically exercised great care in deciding whether to un-
dertake an arrest, id. at 55-56, 59; expressed great caution regarding the use of any
physical force-even grabbing the arm of a suspect, id. at 108, 116, 246 (Items 86, 102);
and kept careful track of the amount of time that elapsed after a suspect voluntarily
appeared at the police station (apparently out of concern that the courts would focus on
that fact, even though the law contains no express limit on the duration of consensual
questioning). Id. at 107-08. Despite widespread agreement among detectives concern-
ing the importance of securing confessions, fewer than ten percent felt it proper to
promise leniency or other favors in return for a confession or to continue questioning
into the middle of the night. Id. at 249-50 (Items 369, 370, 378). Moreover, with regard
to nearly every category of investigative activity, the survey revealed a perception among
1993] 417
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all the apparent incentives in the system for ignoring procedural de-
tails, and the apparent absence of any effective mechanisms to pre-
vent such behavior, it is surprising to find that the detectives cared
as much about the procedural rules as Miyazawa found.
As Miyazawa suggests, one possible explanation for this level of
concern may relate to the district he was observing.35 He reports
that the district had a reputation for being especially procedure-con-
scious (which, he hypothesizes, may be one of the reasons he was
permitted to observe it).36 Yet there is nothing to suggest that the
district was different in kind, rather than simply degree, from other
regions of Japan.37
A second possibility is that Miyazawa has underestimated the
impact of internal constraints on detective behavior. He observes
that compliance with procedural standards was not rewarded and
implies that procedural violations went unpunished. However,
when I asked a Japanese prosecutor what would happen if a police
detective repeatedly violated procedural requirements, he immedi-
ately replied that the detective would be demoted and would go
back on the beat. Rereading Miyazawa with that comment in mind, I
find hints ofjust such an attitude. Miyazawa notes that prosecutors
at times refused to seek detention warrants or declined to prosecute
cases because of procedural irregularities by police. He quotes a
police supervisor who, in sharply criticizing mistakes in investigation
papers prepared by his subordinates, emphasized the impact on the
police station's reputation. That supervisor stated: "The [headquar-
ters] Detective Bureau chief meets with the prosecutor four times
each month. And if papers are prepared carelessly for the prosecu-
tor, he's going to tell the chief that [this station] is hopeless." 38
Given these concerns over proper observance of rules, coupled with
the degree to which supervisors actively monitor procedural compli-
ance by detectives, it is hard to believe that repeated procedural vio-
lations would not subject a detective to some form of internal
sanction.
most detectives that judicial scrutiny has become stricter, which suggests that the detec-
tives felt the need to exercise considerable care over proper procedures. Id. at 124-26,
137.
35 Id. at 32.
36 Id. at 32, 233.
37 In fact, if transfers work in the manner Miyazawa describes-largely as rewards for
successful performance-and if all that really counts is high clearance rates, with little
regard for procedural compliance, id. at 214, 234, one might expect this district, which
was regarded by the police as a desirable posting, to have had more than its normal
share of free-wheeling, aggressive investigators.
38 Id. at 201.
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Without doubt the single largest reason for the relative absence
of procedural violations, though, lies in what Miyazawa refers to as
the "enabling legal environment." For most cases, the Code of
Criminal Procedure itself, and the manner in which the courts have
interpreted its provisions, provide police with ample tools to con-
duct thorough investigations, including intensive interrogation of
suspects, without violating procedural requirements. As Miyazawa
says, "The formal legal system in Japan provides detectives with so
many advantages that they rarely need to resort to obviously illegal
tactics."3 9
Perhaps the clearest example of this enabling environment lies
in provisions that, as interpreted by the courts, permit police to con-
duct custodial interrogation of suspects for up to twenty-three days
following their arrest before the prosecutors must decide whether to
indict.40 A cursory reading of the Constitution and Code might lead
one to believe that there are numerous limitations on use of the
twenty-three-day period for questioning by police. Among these ap-
parent limitations are the following: suspects appear to enjoy the
right to silence (of which they must be notified)4 1 and the right to
counsel;42 the stated reasons for detention are to prevent flight and
destruction of evidence-not to investigate the suspect;43 and the
case must be transferred from the police to the prosecutors after
39 Id. at 25.
40 This period consists of 48 hours before the police must transfer the case to the
prosecutors, CODE CRIM. P. art. 203(1); 24 more hours before the prosecutors must
either release or seek a warrant to detain the suspect, id. art. 205(1); and up to 20 days of
detention before an indictment must be filed. Id. art. 208.
41 CONST. art. 38 ("No person shall be compelled to testify against himself. Confes-
sion made under compulsion, torture or threat, or after prolonged arrest or detention,
shall not be admitted in evidence."); CODE CRIM. P. arts. 198(1) (When necessary for an
investigation, the police "may request a suspect to appear and may question the suspect;
provided, however, that except in cases where the suspect is under arrest or under de-
tention, the suspect may refuse to appear or, having appeared, may leave at any time."),
198(2) ("In the case of questioning under the preceding section, the suspect shall be
notified in advance that he need not answer any question against his will."), 291 (at trial,
"[a]fter the indictment has been read, the presiding judge must notify the accused that
he may be silent at all times and refuse to answer any question"), 311 (accused may be
silent throughout trial), 319 ("Confession made under compulsion, torture or threat, or
after prolonged arrest or detention, or that is suspected not to have been made volunta-
rily, shall not be admitted in evidence.").
42 CONST. art. 34 ("No person shall be arrested or detained without being at once
informed of the charges against him or without the immediate privilege of counsel.");
CODE CRIM. P. arts. 203 (Upon arrest, the police "shall immediately inform the suspect
of the essential facts of the crime and the fact that he is entitled to select defense coun-
sel."), 272 ("Upon the institution of prosecution, the court shall notify the accused with-
out delay that he may appoint counsel and that he may request the appointment of
counsel when he cannot do so because of poverty or other causes.").
43 CODE CRIM. P. art. 60.
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just two days-not twenty-three. 44 In practice, however, courts have
accepted the police position that, by negative implication from a
provision stating that suspects who are not under arrest or in deten-
tion may leave at any time,45 suspects who have been arrested or
detained have a duty to "submit" to questioning.46 Suspects need
not answer any questions, but they have no choice but to sit there
and listen. The Constitution guarantees that suspects are entitled to
the immediate privilege of counsel upon arrest, but only if they can
afford to retain an attorney.47 Under another Code provision, meet-
ings with counsel may be conditioned on the needs of the investiga-
tion.4s This provision has been used to sharply limit meetings with
counsel in cases police or prosecutors regard as difficult, and even
to prohibit meetings altogether throughout the early stages of inter-
rogation. And the courts have never recognized the right to have
counsel present during questioning. By implication from these and
other provisions of the Code, courts consistently condone the use of
the 23-day period for questioning.49 Finally, while the "case" must
be transferred to the prosecutors after two days, the suspect need
not be. Suspects are frequently detained in police holding cells,
where they are readily available for questioning by police, through-
out the 23-day period. 50 Given these and similarly enabling stan-
dards with regard to search and seizure and other investigative
techniques, Japanese police may undertake aggressive investigations
in most cases without ever facing questions of illegality, so long as
they exercise some care in preparing the cases properly.
With this enabling environment in mind, some reexamination
of the dividing line between aggressive investigations and legally
questionable behavior may be warranted. Miyazawa's examples of
questionable behavior include activities expressly upheld by the
Supreme Court-such as post-indictment questioning of suspects
44 Id. at art. 203(1).
45 Id. at art. 198(1). See supra note 41 for a quotation.
46 See, e.g., HIROSHI TAMIYA, KEIJISOSH6H6 [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAw] 126-27
(1992). Some commentators agree with this interpretation, but currently most academ-
ics argue that suspects should have no duty to submit to questioning. Id. For a discus-
sion of this debate, see Foote, supra note 20, at 435-36.
47 See supra note 41.
48 CONST. art. 39(3) (Prosecutors and police may, "when necessary for the investiga-
tion, designate the place, date and time" of meetings with counsel.). For a further dis-
cussion of this issue, see Hiroshi Tamiya, On the Designation of Communication with Counsel,
4 LAw IN JAPAN 87 (1970); Kazuo Itoh, On Publication of the "Citizens' Human Rights Re-
ports", 20 LAw IN JAPAN 29, 54-61 (1987); Foote, supra note 20, at 432-34.
49 See, e.g., Foote, supra note 20, at 429-36, 440-53, 455-58, 462-64, and cases and
materials discussed therein.
50 See, e.g., Frank Bennett, Jr., Pretrial Detention in Japan: Overview and Introductory Note,
23 LAw IN JAPAN 67 (1990).
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and use of physical restraints to stop a suspect from running away
during so-called "duty questioning." From an American due pro-
cess mindset, many of these activities appear questionable; but in
view of the Japanese Supreme Court's precedent, it is probably un-
fair to fault the police for questionable behavior in this regard.51
That is not to say that Japanese police detectives are gentle and
deferential to the personal autonomy of suspects. Miyazawa's ob-
servations convincingly demonstrate otherwise. But, as Miyazawa
ultimately concludes, the blame for this state of affairs (or the credit,
depending on one's viewpoint) does not lie entirely, or even primar-
ily, with the police, but rather with the prosecutors, courts, and ulti-
mately the legislature and the public, that have created and
supported the existing system. In fact, one of the most interesting
aspects of Miyazawa's study is his identification of instances in which
prosecutors and courts may have encouraged the police to engage
in aggressive behavior.
The concept of "voluntary" investigations, for example, may
encourage aggressive questioning of suspects. Police state that
"arrest is for the guilty" and are reluctant to arrest until they have a
full confession. 52 Courts seem to agree and have construed the no-
tion of "consent" or "voluntariness" so broadly that it permits
much questioning without probable cause. In the most extreme
case to date, the so-called Takanawa Green Mansion Case,53 the
Supreme Court concluded that police actions did not exceed the
bounds of voluntariness, and that the resulting confession was
therefore consensual. Four police officers picked up a murder sus-
pect one morning as he was leaving his company dormitory. Upon
getting his consent, they took him to a police station, where they
questioned him from morning until late at night for four consecu-
tive days, arranging his lodging on the intervening nights (with po-
lice occupying the adjoining room the first night). The suspect
finally left the station only after his mother came to Tokyo from the
family home in another prefecture and signed a statement assuring
police that she would take responsibility for her son.
54
51 In these instances, Miyazawa bases his determination of questionability on the
existence of isolated district court opinions rejecting the activities in question (based on
the specific facts involved). For example, after acknowledging Supreme Court prece-
dent permitting physical restraint of a suspect who seeks to run away, Miyazawa points
to a single district court decision that had found such physical restraint illegal, then
concludes, "Depending upon the circumstances ... there is a possibility that similar ac-
tions will be held illegal." MIyAZAWA, supra note 1, at 114 (emphasis added).
52 Id. at 105.




In upholding the voluntariness of this investigation, the
Supreme Court noted the gravity of the crime and the degree of
suspicion, as well as the fact that there was no evidence in the record
to indicate that the suspect had ever asked to leave the police sta-
tion. The Court also emphasized that this case came very close to
exceeding permissible limits (with two of the five Justices who con-
sidered the case finding that it in fact had exceeded those limits).
55
If the limits extend this far, however, police obviously have consid-
erable room within which to operate without approaching the
bounds of illegality. Although the courts do not force the police to
proceed on a voluntary basis rather than through arrests, judicial
willingness to accept even rather intrusive conduct as "voluntary"
appears to represent tacit encouragement to police to proceed in
this manner, even if the police may lack probable cause.
The very notion that voluntary questioning is a substitute for
arrest, moreover, reflects the assumption that interrogation of the
suspect is an integral part of all arrests and investigations. That as-
sumption in turn rests on the view that confessions are a central
element of the Japanese criminal justice system.56 Although the
courts routinely inform defendants of their right to remain silent, it
is clear that judges expect the police and prosecutors to have ob-
tained full confessions before instituting prosecution. 57 Convictions
based solely on circumstantial evidence, without confessions, are
still rare enough to warrant headlines in major case reporting serv-
ices. The courts are not satisfied with simple admissions of the "I
did it"-type, either. Even in routine, uncontested cases, the police
and prosecutors typically prepare several confession statements, to-
talling fifty pages or more, during the course of the investigation. In
more complicated cases, the confession statements may reach hun-
dreds of pages. At least in major or contested cases, courts typically
scrutinize very carefully the contents of these confession statements.
They are not verbatim accounts, but rather are summaries prepared
by the police or prosecutors, typically after several hours or even
days of questioning. In their review, courts look for thorough and
convincing confessions: confessions that cover all major details of
55 Id.
56 See, e.g., Haruo Abe, Police Interrogation Privileges and Limiations Under Foreign Law:
Japan, 52 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SI. 67, 67-69 (1961) (describing impor-
tance of obtaining confessions); Keiji Yonezawa, Higisha no torishirabe [Questioning of Sus-
pects], 537 HANREi TAIMUZU 61, 61 (1984) ("[W]ith certain exceptions, such as cases in
which the suspect is caught in the act, it is necessary and indispensable . . . to get the
suspect himself to tell the whole story.").
57 See, e.g., Hirano, supra note 28, at 135-37; Foote, supra note 20, at 440-64, and cases
and materials discussed therein.
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the crime, the defendant's motives and intent, and even the defend-
ant's background and character; that do not contain too many shifts
or inconsistencies with the physical evidence and that reveal secrets
that only the real criminal would know.
Not surprisingly, prosecutors and police construe this judicial
expectation of near-perfect confessions as a basic demand.
Miyazawa quotes one organized crime detective's statement that
"courts and prosecutors require confessions even if there is evi-
dence," then adds: "When a prosecutor refused to indict'in one
case, an organized crime detective remarked, 'I wonder if the real
reason wasn't because there was no confession. No matter how
solid your proof is, I guess without a confession they won't indict for
you.' "58 A constant theme throughout Miyazawa's case studies is
the desire of the police to obtain thorough confessions. For the
most part all the investigative tools he describes-voluntary appear-
ances, arrest, detention, and even search and seizure-are viewed as
means to the end of securing full confessions.
In one significant respect, judicial standards for evaluating the
credibility of confessions may have helped perpetuate an investiga-
tive pattern that has come under great criticism in recent years:
seeking a confession early in the investigation, without conducting a
full investigation of other evidence, then collecting corroborating
evidence based on information obtained directly from the suspect.
Critics have observed that this practice may lead to mistaken convic-
tions stemming purely from the hunches of police officers and have
claimed that the practice is primarily a matter of convenience for the
police, since it is often far easier for them to proceed in this manner
than to try to find the other evidence themselves.5 9 As Miyazawa's
interviews reveal, however, the courts' own review standards help
perpetuate this practice. One of the key criteria used by the courts
in evaluating credibility is whether a confession reveals any secrets
known only by the offender. As a result, Miyazawa reports: "Detec-
tives as a policy do not collect too much evidence before the confes-
sion. [As a detective stated in one case], 'If we run a complete
investigation at the scene, there will be a question of whether we
have gotten a statement that conforms to our own preconceived
58 MIYAZAWA, supra note 1, at 159.
59 See, e.g., K6ICHIR6 YOKOYAMA, GOHAN NO KOZo-NIHONGATA KEIJI SAIBAN NO HIKARI
TO KAGE [THE STRUCTURE OF MISTAKEN CONVICTIONS-THE BRIGHT AND DARK SIDES OF
JAPANESE-STYLE CRIMINAL TRIALS] 11-22 (1985) (concluding that in the great majority of




ideas.' "60 Thus, the judiciary may inadvertently be influencing po-
lice to maintain investigative practices that focus on confessions
first, physical evidence later.
While the basic tenor ofjudicial opinions is to support the im-
portance of confessions, Miyazawa's study shows that the courts, at
least in lower court opinions, frequently criticize the police's delib-
erate use of subterfuge and pretext. The most frequently cited ex-
ample involves so-called "arrest for another crime"-a pattern in
which police arrest a suspect for one crime, typically a minor crime,
and then use the bulk of the ensuing 23-day period of custody to
question the suspect about some other crime for which police lack
probable cause. 6' As Miyazawa discusses, a similar pattern exists in
the search and seizure area, with police at times securing a warrant
to search for evidence of one crime on which they possess probable
cause, but with the true aim of finding evidence of a second, typi-
cally more serious crime, on which they will then proceed to arrest
and interrogate the suspect.
62
Miyazawa's observations and survey reveal widespread recogni-
tion among detectives and supervisors of the problematic nature of
such use of pretext. 63 Nonetheless, the interviews and case studies
disclose that detectives deliberately utilize these techniques, at least
when they feel the circumstances demand. Despite the supervisors'
professed adherence to procedural standards, Miyazawa reports that
at least for this category of investigative activities, supervisors some-
times push detectives to bend the rules.
64
This use of pretext, then, may represent one area in which
Miyazawa's characterization of police practices as "questionable" is
accurate, even in the enabling legal environment he describes. Still,
it would be useful to know how often and, in particular, in what
types of cases the activities in question occur. Miyazawa's case stud-
ies suggest that such pretexts are most frequently used by detec-
tives, and condoned or even encouraged by supervisors, in cases
that meet each of three separate conditions: (1) there are strong
suspicions (albeit short of probable cause) about a particular sus-
pect; (2) the case involves either a serious crime, a crime that is diffi-
cult to prove (such as bribery), or a series of several thefts or other
crimes; and (3) the suspect refuses to cooperate in the investigation.
60 MIYAZAWA, supra note I, at 159.
61 For a discussion of the academic debate and judicial precedent on the "arrest for
another crime" issue, see Foote, supra note 20, at 440-45.
62 MIYAZAWA, supra note 1, at 122.
63 Id. at 69, 191-92.
64 Id. at 122, 129, 198.
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If that is in fact the pattern in which pretext is utilized, a strong
argument can be made that the police Miyazawa observed were not
only acting within the limits permitted by judicial precedent, but in
fact were doing precisely what the Japanese courts seem to be sig-
nalling. In determining whether certain types of police action are
permissible, Japanese courts in a wide range of cases have utilized a
broad balancing test, weighing the perceived needs of the investiga-
tors against the interests of the individual. The courts frequently
cite factors such as the degree of suspicion, the gravity and nature of
the crime, and the "need" for prompt questioning. In this vein,
Miyazawa quotes one judge who states that "some investigations can
be permitted as lawful voluntary investigations even when the sus-
pect does not consent," arguing that difficult-to-prove cases such as
bribery and election law violations could not be prosecuted other-
wise.65 Thus, if the Sapporo police detectives were arresting on a
different-but valid-charge or were searching for evidence of a dif-
ferent crime-but with probable cause, and if they truly had strong
suspicions of involvement in a serious crime or in multiple crimes
and reasonably believed that custodial interrogation would aid in
the investigation, they may have been doing exactly what mostJapa-
nese courts want.
CONCLUSION
Miyazawa's study clearly reveals that there is another side to the
Japanese police from the omawarisan-the kindly patrolman walking
the beat or sitting in the police box-that has permeated most
American images of Japanese police until now.6 6 As his research
shows, the Japanese police routinely engage in aggressive investiga-
tions, often accompanied by long and intense interrogation of sus-
pects, and at times utilize techniques of at least questionable legality
in achieving their aims.
Based on Miyazawa's own data and case studies, though, one
can construct a picture quite different from that of a largely uncon-
trolled police force "making crime" that one might infer from his
title and much of the rhetoric in the book. Under this alternative
interpretation, the Japanese police for the most part carefully ob-
serve the existing procedural standards and truly attempt to con-
form their behavior to the law, as it has been interpreted by the
65 Id. at 288.
66 All of the English-language sources cited supra note 11 offer a generally positive
picture of the Japanese police. AMES, supra note 11, at 17-55; BAYLEY, supra note 11, at
11-51; and PARKER, supra note 11, at 44-79, provide extensive accounts of the police
walking the beat and interacting with the community.
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courts, without seeking to push every judicial precedent to the limit.
And while the procedural standards are highly enabling, judicial in-
terpretations and police practice alike utilize a balancing approach,
with the cases falling along a continuum.
On this view, the low end of that continuum consists of cases in
which the crime is not especially serious, suspicion is relatively low,
or the suspect is generally cooperative. In those cases, the appropri-
ate police response is a "voluntary investigation" in which the sus-
pect is given the opportunity to explain him- or herself without
facing the stigma of an arrest.
The middle range of the continuum includes at least moder-
ately serious crimes where the detectives have probable cause for
either an arrest or a search for evidence of the crime in question.
For this range of cases, supervisors do not treat failure to comply
with applicable procedural standards as acceptable. Rather, where
detectives could achieve their investigative aims without bending
the rules, supervisors would insist that they do so. 6 7 This category
probably contains most of the cases Miyazawa observed in which su-
pervisors sharply criticized the procedural failings of detectives.
The top end of the continuum consists of serious crimes where
suspicion of a particular suspect is high but the suspect refuses to
cooperate. Miyazawa's case studies suggest that decisions on how to
treat cases in this last stage in the continuum are not made lightly.
Supervisors screen the cases carefully and examine whether there
are other alternatives before approving an escalation in strategy.
Where the police conclude they have no other choice, 68 though, for
this class of cases, detectives are willing to bend the rules. Their
supervisors condone or even encourage the action, the prosecutors
and judges look the other way or declare that the police activity was
justified "in light of all relevant circumstances," and the mass me-
dia, if it mentions the case at all, voices its approval. This state of
affairs holds unless and until a case arises in which it turns out that
67 For these cases, detectives still might opt to provide the suspect with the opportu-
nity to proceed voluntarily, without arresting him or her. Miyazawa's observations re-
veal that detectives frequently obtained proper arrest warrants first, and simply chose
not to execute them if the suspect complied voluntarily. This apparently did not mean
that the police in those cases were using the voluntary appearance as a means for evad-
ing the time limits under the Code of Criminal Procedure. To the contrary, they re-
garded the clock as having started to run as soon as the suspect was brought into the
station.
68 Of course, there is one other, rather obvious, alternative available: treat the mat-
ter as unsolved and let the suspect go, at least until other corroborating evidence can be




the suspect really was innocent. At that point the police may close
ranks but all the others immediately seek to distance themselves,
with the mass media shouting out its condemnation.
Given this interpretation of Miyazawa's findings, some observ-
ers might well wonder if harms exist. After all, in the great majority
of cases, the police observe the existing procedural rules. Except in
rare instances, the innocent are screened out early and suffer at
most the relatively modest intrusion of a voluntary appearance at
the police station. And the guilty get caught. They may have to
undergo several days, or even weeks, of interrogation, with no coun-
sel present. But they won't face physical abuse. And the question-
ing, along with the bit of moral guidance that often goes along with
it, might even be good for them.
I believe harms exist, even if one accepts the benign view-
which, despite his rhetoric, Miyazawa largely confirms-that Japa-
nese police generally observe the procedural rules laid down by the
courts. 69 These harms include the potential for mistaken confes-
sions and convictions, the potential for bias, the degree of intrusion
on personal autonomy, the questionable weight accorded to the
constitutional and statutory guarantees of voluntariness and to
other due process rights, and the relative absence of effective exter-
nal checks on the activities of the police and prosecutors (which in
turn means external mechanisms to assure that the questionable ac-
tivities are limited to cases at the upper end of the continuum).
Miyazawa's detailed case studies, together with his descriptions of
recent scandals involving the police, serve to highlight these dan-
gers. Nonetheless, it is by no means a rhetorical question to ask
whether these harms are outweighed by the benefits of the Japanese
criminal justice system. Proper evaluation of that question, how-
ever, requires consideration of the investigative process in the con-
text of the criminal justice system as a whole-a topic that lies
beyond the scope of Miyazawa's book.
69 See Foote, supra note 20; Daniel H. Foote, The Benevolent Paternalism ofJapanese Crim-
inal Justice, 80 CAL. L. REV. 317 (1992); Daniel H. Foote, From Japan 's Death Row to Free-
dom, 1 PAc. Rim L. & POL'YJ. 11 (1992).
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